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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 











ROBERT LELLOCK;  
LYNN MEYERS-JEFFREY;  
RONALD ZANGARO   
_____________ 
        
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania                                                          
District Court No. 2-13-cv-00194 
District Judge: The Honorable Terrence F. McVerry 
                               
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
May 19, 2016 
 
Before: SMITH, HARDIMAN, and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed:  May 20, 2016)                              
_____________________ 
 
  OPINION 





                                                 
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 
not constitute binding precedent. 
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SMITH, Circuit Judge. 
 Plaintiff David Jankowski alleges that Defendant Robert Lellock, a former 
Arthur J. Rooney Middle School Police Officer, sexually abused Jankowski on 
multiple occasions.  The question in this appeal, however, is whether Jankowski 
has alleged facts sufficient to make out a claim for relief against Defendants Lynn 
Meyers-Jeffrey and Ronald Zangaro, the detention aide and the school principal, 
respectively, at Rooney Middle School.  Jankowski alleges that both individuals 
knew or should have known that Lellock was pulling students out of class for one-
on-one meetings.  He then concludes that both individuals knew or should have 
known Lellock was abusing these students.  Jankowski, however, has failed to 
plead any facts supporting this inference.  He has thus failed to make out a viable 
cause of action against either Meyers-Jeffrey or Zangaro, despite having had three 
opportunities to do so.  We therefore hold that the District Court did not err in 
dismissing the claims against both Meyers-Jeffrey and Zangaro and will affirm the 
District Court’s judgment. 
I. 
 Starting in the fall of 1998 and lasting until May 1999,1 Lellock, at the time 
a School Police Officer employed by the Pittsburgh Public Schools, allegedly 
abused up to twenty-two male students at Rooney Middle School.  Jankowski was 
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one of Lellock’s victims.  Jankowski alleges that on multiple occasions during the 
1998-1999 school year, Lellock removed him from Meyers-Jeffrey’s study 
hall/detention classroom, took him to a supply closet, and sexually violated him. 
 While criminal charges against Lellock also resulted, Jankowski brought this 
lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  Jankowski claims that Lellock violated his right 
to bodily integrity, which is secured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and enforced through § 1983.  Jankowski’s original complaint named 
as defendants the Pittsburgh Public Schools and eighteen individuals (including 
Lellock, Meyers-Jeffrey, and Zangaro) who were connected in various ways with 
Rooney Middle School.  However, after his first two complaints were dismissed in 
part for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), 
Jankowski amended his complaint to sue only three individuals: Lellock, Meyers-
Jeffrey, and Zangaro. 
 Meyers-Jeffrey was a detention aide at Rooney Middle School for the 1998-
1999 school year and it was from her classroom that Jankowski alleges he was 
pulled by Lellock on multiple occasions over the course of the school year.  
Jankowski also alleges that Lellock pulled up to twenty-one other boys from 
Meyers-Jeffrey’s classroom over the course of the year, explaining to her that he 
needed to speak to the student or that the student was “in trouble again.”  This was, 
                                                                                                                                                             
1 The second amended complaint does not give specific dates or date ranges. 
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according to Jankowski, a violation of district policy. 
 Zangaro was the principal of Rooney Middle School, and Jankowski alleges 
that he knew that Lellock was removing students from class for one-on-one 
meetings, yet failed to do anything to stop it.  In addition to alleging supervisory 
liability, Jankowski alleges that Zangaro failed to properly train his staff on the 
district’s policy prohibiting anyone from pulling students from classrooms. 
 After considering Jankowski’s second amended complaint, however, the 
District Court again dismissed the claims against everyone except Lellock, 
explaining that Jankowski had not carried his burden of pleading facts sufficient to 
suggest liability on the part of anyone besides Lellock.  While this dismissal was 
initially an interlocutory order because the claims against Lellock were still 
pending, the District Court later granted Jankowski’s Rule 54(b) motion to convert 
the order into a final decision, thus permitting immediate appeal.  Accordingly, on 
August 12, 2015, Jankowski appealed the District Court’s order holding that his 
second amended complaint failed to plead a cause of action against Meyers-Jeffrey 
and Zangaro. 
II. 
 “We review a district court’s decision granting a motion to dismiss under a 
plenary standard.”  Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 206 (3d Cir. 2009).  
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the legal sufficiency of a 
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complaint, which may be dismissed for the “failure to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).  When considering a motion to 
dismiss, we take a three-step approach: 
First, the court must take note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to 
state a claim.  Second, the court should identify allegations that, 
because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the 
assumption of truth.  Finally, where there are well-pleaded factual 
allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine 
whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief. 
Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting 
Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal citations 
and quotation marks omitted)).  Regarding factual allegations, as the Supreme 
Court made clear in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, such allegations “must be 
enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”  550 U.S. 544, 555 
(2007).  We have further held that when performing this analysis, we “accept the 
factual allegations contained in the Complaint as true, but we disregard rote recitals 
of the elements of a cause of action, legal conclusions, and mere conclusory 
statements.”  James v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 700 F.3d 675, 679 (3d Cir. 2012) 
(citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-
57; Burtch, 662 F.3d at 220-21). 
 Thus, in order for Jankowski’s complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, it 
must allege facts that, if true, suggest a plausible entitlement to relief against 
Meyers-Jeffrey and Zangaro.  See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“A claim has facial 
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plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw 
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”).   
 The District Court assumed for the purpose of deciding the motion to 
dismiss that Jankowski made out a claim against Lellock for violation of his right 
to bodily integrity.  That said, it is clearly established that government officials are 
liable only for their own unconstitutional conduct, and cannot “be held liable for 
the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat 
superior.”  Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 366 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Iqbal, 556 
U.S. at 676).  We must, therefore, look at each defendant’s own actions as alleged 
in the complaint.   
 In this regard, Jankowski does not claim that either Meyers-Jeffrey or 
Zangaro actively encouraged or participated in the illegal conduct of Lellock; 
instead he attempts to show that both Meyers-Jeffrey and Zangaro knew or should 
have known about Lellock’s actions and did nothing.  Section 1983 liability 
attaches only if there is either a supervisor-subordinate relationship or a state law 
duty to control the actions of the primary actor.  C.H. ex rel. Z.H. v. Oliva, 226 
F.3d 198, 201 (3d Cir. 2000) (“It is, of course, well established that a defendant in 
a civil rights case cannot be held responsible for a constitutional violation which he 
or she neither participated in nor approved.”); Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 
F.3d 1286, 1294 (3d Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Burlington N. & 
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Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006) (“[E]xcept perhaps in unusual 
circumstances, a government official or employee who lacks supervisory authority 
over the person who commits a constitutional tort cannot be held, based on mere 
inaction, to have ‘acquiesced’ in the unconstitutional conduct.”). 
 Once this supervisory relationship is established, we have articulated two 
ways in which a supervisor may be liable for unconstitutional actions undertaken 
by a subordinate.  First, liability may attach if the supervisor, “‘with deliberate 
indifference to the consequences, established and maintained a policy, practice or 
custom which directly caused [the] constitutional harm.’”  A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v. 
Luzerne Cty. Juvenile Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir. 2004) (alteration in 
original) (quoting Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720, 725 (3d 
Cir. 1989)).  This standard encompasses Jankowski’s failure to train claim, and 
specifically requires (1) deliberate indifference and (2) direct causation.  Black by 
Black v. Indiana Area Sch. Dist., 985 F.2d 707, 712-13 (3d Cir. 1993).   
 Second, at least prior to Iqbal, “a supervisor may be personally liable under 
§ 1983 if he or she participated in violating the plaintiff’s rights, directed others to 
violate them, or, as the person in charge, had knowledge of and acquiesced” in the 
subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct.  A.M. ex rel. J.M.K., 372 F.3d at 586 
(citing Baker v. Monroe Twp., 50 F.3d 1186, 1190-91 (3d Cir. 1995)).  Or, put 
another way,  
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[A] plaintiff asserting a failure to supervise claim must not only 
identify a specific supervisory practice that the defendant failed to 
employ, he or she must also allege both (1) contemporaneous 
knowledge of the offending incident or knowledge of a prior pattern 
of similar incidents, and (2) circumstances under which the 
supervisor’s inaction could be found to have communicated a message 
of approval. 
  
Oliva, 226 F.3d at 202 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).  “[W]e 
have refrained from answering the question of whether Iqbal eliminated—or at 
least narrowed the scope of—supervisory liability because it was ultimately 
unnecessary to do so in order to dispose of the appeal then before us.”  Argueta v. 
U.S. Imm. and Customs Enforcement, 643 F.3d 60, 70 (3d Cir. 2011).  As in 
Argueta, we “make the same choice here because we determine that [Jankowski] 
failed to allege a plausible claim to relief on the basis of the supervisors’ 
‘knowledge and acquiescence’ or any other similar theory of liability.”  Id. 
III. 
 Applying this legal framework to the facts in Jankowski’s second amended 
complaint convinces us that the District Court correctly dismissed the claims 
against both Meyers-Jeffrey and Zangaro.  First, Jankowski never alleges that 
either Meyers-Jeffrey, who was merely an aide in the detention classroom, or 
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Zangaro had any supervisory or actual authority2 over Lellock, thus immediately 
casting serious doubt on both claims.  Second, Jankowski’s second amended 
complaint, stripped of its conclusory allegations, pleads very few facts, none of 
which transform his claims into anything more than pure speculation.  This is so 
because Jankowski relies primarily on the strength of an inference that we believe 
is unreasonable.  He argues that because Lellock (1) pulled approximately twenty-
two male students out of detention over the course of the school year to talk to 
them individually and (2) did so in apparent violation of a district policy forbidding 
the removal of students from a classroom, it was “obvious” that Lellock was 
intending to have “private one-on-one encounters with those male students.”  Thus, 
he concludes that Meyers-Jeffrey and Zangaro knew or should have known that 
Lellock was sexually abusing these students. 
 We cannot agree with Jankowski that this final inference is reasonable in 
light of the facts alleged.  Assuming that either or both individuals did have actual 
                                                 
2 While, presumably, a school principal has some authority over the school’s police 
officer, Jankowski’s second amended complaint never alleges that Zangaro had 
either supervisory or actual authority over Lellock.  Indeed, the only reference to 
Lellock’s employment status is that he was an employee of the Pittsburgh Public 
Schools, perhaps casting doubt on Zangaro’s authority to control the actions of 
Lellock if we infer that he was also supervised at the district level.  See generally 
Mercedes J. Howze, Pittsburgh Public Schools names new Chief of School Safety, 






authority over Lellock, supervisory liability still requires a plaintiff to show that 
the supervisor knew about and acquiesced in the subordinate’s unconstitutional 
conduct.  A.M. ex rel. J.M.K., 372 F.3d at 586.  Jankowski has not met this 
standard for either Meyers-Jeffrey or Zangaro.  Mere knowledge that students are 
being pulled from class to speak with a school police officer in violation of a 
district policy does not lead one to reasonably conclude that those students are then 
being sexually assaulted by that officer.  The facts alleged, therefore, do not 
support the claim that either Meyers-Jeffrey or Zangaro actually knew about 
Lellock’s conduct during the 1998-1999 school year.  See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 
555 (“Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the 
speculative level.”).  Thus, we hold that both claims of supervisory liability were 
properly dismissed by the District Court. 
 Turning to Jankowski’s failure to train claim, we conclude that this 
allegation fares no better.  The entire claim is relegated to a single sentence in the 
complaint, which simply states that Zangaro “failed to properly train the teachers at 
the Arthur J. Rooney Middle School during the school year 1998 and 1999 school 
year [sic] . . . regarding the School District policy that forbade school police from 
removing children from classrooms for private, unsupervised encounters.”  This is 
merely a rote recitation of a cause of action coupled with a legal conclusion.  City 
of Wilkes-Barre, 700 F.3d at 679 (“[W]e disregard rote recitals of the elements of a 
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cause of action, legal conclusions, and mere conclusory statements.”).  It does not 
contain any facts on which we can or should rely.  We therefore conclude that this 
claim was also properly dismissed by the District Court.3 
IV. 
 For the reasons discussed above, we will affirm the District Court’s 
judgment in favor of Meyers-Jeffrey and Zangaro. 
                                                 
3 Indeed, even if Jankowski had shown a failure to train, he presents no facts 
suggesting such a failure would have been anything more than mere negligence; 
far short of the high “deliberate indifference” standard he also had to satisfy.  See 
Black by Black v. Indiana Area Sch. Dist., 985 F.2d 707, 713 (3d Cir. 1993). 
